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Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
In [Author 2009a] I argued that there are epistemic Frankfurt
cases that serve to show that knowledge does not require safety
from error. In this paper, I revisit these Frankfurt cases. I first
argue that a recent response to my earlier argument by Duncan
Pritchard remains unsatisfactory. I then show that Frankfurt
cases impact a much wider range of accounts. Specifically, I ar-
gue in some detail that, in conjunction with the infamous Fake
Barn cases, they generate a problem for the two most prominent
virtue theoretic accounts to knowledge, due to Ernest Sosa and
John Greco. Finally, I conclude by offering some reason to think
that the lesson these cases teach may just be that a knowledge
first approach to epistemology is favourable to its traditional
rival.
1 Introduction
Since Gettier’s seminal [1963] article, one of the key tasks in epis-
temology has been to identify a condition that, in conjunction with
justified true belief, is sufficient for knowledge. Whilst a lot of ink
has been spilled on this project, it is fair to say that the search for a
successful ‘anti-Gettier’ condition, and hence for a workable account
of knowledge, is ongoing.
That said, there are a number of live proposals on the market.
Among the most promising candidates are safety-based [e.g. Sosa
1999, Pritchard 2005, 2012a] and virtue epistemological [e.g. Greco
2010, 2012, Sosa 2010, 2011] accounts of knowledge. The core idea of
safety-based accounts is that knowledge requires safety from error.
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Roughly, this means that knowledge requires one to avoid error at
nearby possible worlds. In contrast, virtue epistemology (VE) has it
that knowledge is a kind of success because of ability. According to
standard versions of the view, the relevant kind of success at issue in
knowledge is true belief and the relevant kind of ability is cognitive
ability, that is, roughly, a disposition to form true beliefs.
In a recent paper [Author 2009a], I argued that no matter whether
safety-based accounts of knowledge can successfully handle Gettier
cases, they are in any case too strong to be necessary for knowledge.
There are cases in which an agent has an unsafe belief that nonethe-
less intuitively qualifies as knowledge. In this paper, I will return to
this argument and show that a recent response to my earlier argu-
ment, due to Pritchard, fails (§2). I will then argue that the relevant
cases also serve to generate a problem for Greco and Sosa’s virtue
epistemological accounts of knowledge (§3). Finally, in the conclu-
sion (§4), I will give some reason to think that the lesson to be learned
here may just be that we should opt for a knowledge first approach
to epistemology.
2 Safety-Based Epistemology
2.1 The Safety Condition on Knowledge
Safety-based epistemology claims that one knows a proposition, p,
only if one safely believes that p. (I will henceforth also refer to this
thesis as ‘the safety condition on knowledge’ or simply ‘the safety
condition’ for short.)
While the core of safety is captured in the idea of avoidance of
error at nearby worlds, there is reason to believe that, in the final
analysis, the safety condition will need a number of further refine-
ments, including at the very least an index to ways of belief forma-
tion [e.g. Pritchard 2005, following Nozick 1981]. It is worth noting
that, if successful, my argument will work against a variety of ways
in which one might implement such refinements. For instance, it
will work against strong versions of the safety condition according to
which knowledge requires safety from error across all nearby worlds
as well as weak versions that require safety from error across most
nearby worlds. It will also work against belief-based versions of the
safety condition, according to which knowing p requires avoiding
false belief that p across (the relevant range of) nearby worlds, as well
as method-based versions, according to which knowing p via method
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M requires that M not produce false beliefs across (the relevant range
of) nearby worlds. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will be
focusing on Pritchard’s account of safety, which he states in the fol-
lowing passage:
S’s belief is safe iff in most near-by possible worlds in which S
continues to form her belief about the target proposition in the
same way as in the actual world, and in all very close near-by
possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief about
the target proposition in the same way as the actual world, her
belief continues to be true.1
[Pritchard 2007: 292, 2009: 34]
With Pritchard’s account of safety thus in play, let’s move on to
the argument that knowledge does not require safety. At its heart is
the following case:
Frankfurt Clock. Russell’s arch-nemesis, a powerful demon, has an in-
terest that Russell forms a belief that it’s 8:22 by looking at the grand-
father clock in the hallway when he comes down the stairs. Rus-
sell’s arch-nemesis is prepared to do whatever it may take in order
to ensure that Russell acquires a belief that it’s 8:22 by looking at the
grandfather clock when he comes down the stairs. However, Russell’s
arch-nemesis is also lazy. He will act only if Russell does not come
down the stairs at 8:22 of his own accord. Suppose, as it so happens,
Russell does come down the stairs at 8:22. Russell’s arch-nemesis re-
mains inactive. Russell forms a belief that it’s 8:22. It is 8:22. The
grandfather clock is working reliably as always.2
Intuitively, Russell knows that it is 8:22 in this case. After all, we may
assume, he has the ability to read the clock and forms a belief via
an exercise of this ability. Moreover, the clock is actually functioning
properly and the reading is accurate. At the same time, Russell’s
belief is not safe. After all, among the very close nearby worlds are
worlds at which Russell comes down the stairs a minute earlier or
later. At those worlds, the demon intervenes with the result that
Russell takes a reading from an inaccurate clock and ends up with a
false belief that it is 8:22. At the same time, Russell continues to form
his belief in the same way as in the actual world, i.e. by exercising
his clock-reading ability. Since safety does not tolerate false beliefs at
very close nearby possible worlds at which the agent forms his belief
in the same way as in the actual world, Russell’s belief turns out
unsafe. The safety condition predicts, incorrectly, that Russell does
not know.
3
2.2 Pritchard’s Response
Pritchard responds to this argument by denying that Russell knows
that it’s 8:22. In support of this claim he offers a couple of arguments
and an account of how those who have the intuition could have be-
come entrapped in error. Here is his first argument:
[Russell] is effectively finding out the time by looking at what
is (for him anyway) a stopped clock, since whatever time he
comes downstairs the clock will say ‘8.22 a.m.’. But one cannot
gain knowledge about the time by consulting a stopped clock,
even when one happens to form a true belief!
[Pritchard 2012b: 183, 2013: 160]
I must confess that I don’t find this argument particularly convinc-
ing. To begin with, notice that it is a crucial part of the case that
the clock is functioning properly and is thus not stopped. The issue
of whether the clock is stopped is no more agent-relative than the
issue of whether the earth revolves around the sun. It is no more
plausible that, in Frankfurt Clock, the clock is stopped for Rus-
sell, than it is plausible that the sun revolves around the earth for
Ptolemy. Of course, Pritchard is free to define an agent-relative con-
cept of stopped, but then he evidently cannot appeal to the plausible
idea that one cannot acquire knowledge from a stopped clock in or-
der to argue that an agent who satisfies this agent-relative concept
does not know.
There is further reason to believe that Pritchard’s argument will
not do the trick for him. To see this, consider the following variation
of the case:
Frankfurt Clock*. Russell’s demon nemesis wants Russell to believe
either that it is 8:22 or else that it is past 8:22. He has resolved that if
Russell comes down before 8:22 he will set the clock to 8:22 and if he
comes down at 8:22 or later, he will do nothing. Russell comes down
at 8:22, the demon remains inactive, and Russell acquires a true belief
by taking a competent reading from a perfectly functioning clock.
The intuition of knowledge remains unaffected here. Moreover, Rus-
sell’s belief remains unsafe. After all, Russell might so easily have
come down the stairs a minute earlier, in which case the demon
would have manipulated the clock with the result that the reading
would have been inaccurate. Finally, however, in the present version
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of the case, the clock is not stopped for Russell in the sense envis-
aged by Pritchard. To see this, note that it is not the case that what-
ever time Russell comes downstairs the clock will read ‘8:22’. Russell
might very easily have come down a minute later, in which case the
demon would also have remained inactive and the clock would have
read ‘8:23’. If so, Pritchard’s response is bound to fail anyway.
Let’s move on to Pritchard’s second argument that Russell does
not know. In order to see how it works, we will first have to look at a
different case:
Fake Barns. Barnes, a reliable barn spotter, is driving through the coun-
tryside. He looks out of the window, sees a barn and comes to believe
that he is looking at a barn. Whilst Barnes’s belief is true, unbe-
knownst to him, the structure he is looking at is the only real barn in
an area that is otherwise peppered with fake barns that are indistin-
guishable from real barns, at least from Barnes’s position on the road
[Goldman 1976: 772-73].
I take it to be agreed that Barnes does not know that he is looking at a
barn. Crucially, in Pritchard’s view, Frankfurt Clock is structurally
analogous to Fake Barns. Since, in Fake Barns, Barnes lacks knowl-
edge, we should accept that the same goes for Russell in Frankfurt
Clock [Pritchard 2009: 40].
There are a number of problems with this argument. To begin
with, it is not really clear to me that Frankfurt Clock and Fake
Barns are indeed analogous. For starters, the very fact that they
elicit diverging intuitive verdicts provides some evidence that they
are not analogous after all. What’s more, even if the two cases are
relevantly analogous, it is far from clear that the lesson to be learned
is that, in Frankfurt Clock, Russell lacks knowledge rather than
that, in Fake Barns, Barnes has knowledge. At the very least, this
point affords argument. Unfortunately, Pritchard fails to deliver on
this front.
That said, Pritchard might be able to discharge at least part of
the burden that he now finds himself settled with by offering a plau-
sible error theory for the intuition that Russell knows. In order to
achieve this, Pritchard distinguishes between knowledge on the one
hand, and cognitive achievement on the other. A cognitive achieve-
ment is, roughly, a cognitive success that is primarily creditable to
cognitive ability. Knowledge, in contrast, features both a weaker
ability condition—i.e. it requires cognitive success that is not pri-
marily but to a significant degree creditable to cognitive ability—and
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the safety condition. The idea then is that, while knowledge and
cognitive achievement often go hand-in-hand, they can sometimes
come apart. Cases like Frankfurt Clock constitute one type of case
in which they do. Those who have the intuition that Russell has
knowledge in this case mistake cognitive achievement for knowledge
[Pritchard 2009: 40, 2012b: 183, 2013: 160].
There are two problems with Pritchard’s error theory. To see the
first, notice that what Pritchard owes us at this stage is an explanation
of why our intuition leads us astray in Frankfurt Clock but not in
Fake Barns. Pritchard’s story does not achieve this. After all, Fake
Barns, too, is a case of cognitive achievement without knowledge.
If, in such cases, we are prone to mistake cognitive achievement for
knowledge, the question remains why we don’t do so in Fake Barns.
The issue that affords diagnosis—why intuition leads us astray in
Frankfurt Clock but not in Fake Barns—thus remains unresolved.
Pritchard’s diagnosis fails on yet another and more significant
count: there are variations of Frankfurt Clock in which the agent
does not secure a cognitive achievement, at least not by Pritchard’s
own lights. To see this, notice that, besides cases of cognitive achieve-
ment without knowledge, Pritchard also grants that there are cases of
knowledge without cognitive achievement. Most importantly, cases
of testimonial knowledge in which the greatest part of the cognitive
work is done by the testifier and not the receiver of testimony fall
under this heading [Pritchard 2008: 446 and Pritchard et al. 2010: 40-
43]. That means that if we can offer a (suitable) variation of Frank-
furt Clock involving testimonial knowledge in which the bulk of
the cognitive work is done by the testifier, Pritchard is committed to
treating the case as one in which the agent does not secure a cogni-
tive achievement. If so, his diagnosis of Frankfurt Clock in terms
of mistaking cognitive achievement for knowledge is bound to fail.
This leaves us with the task of providing a suitable case. Here
goes:
Frankfurt Clock**. As Russell comes down the stairs his little cousin,
who cannot yet read the clock, asks him what time it is. Russell
looks at the clock, sees that it reads 8:22 and tells his cousin that it
is 8:22. On that basis, Russell’s cousin acquires a true belief that it
is 8:22. Unbeknownst to both of them, the cousin’s demon nemesis
was lurking in the background, prepared to set the clock to 8:22 had
Russell not happened to look at it at just the right time, i.e. at precisely
8:22.
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Just as in Frankfurt Clock before, intuitively, the cousin’s belief
qualifies as knowledge. At the same time, this belief is not safe. At
many nearby possible worlds, including very close ones, at which
Russell’s cousin acquires the belief via testimony from Russell, Rus-
sell comes down the stairs a minute earlier or later. Since, in that
case, the demon shows his hand, at those worlds the cousin ends up
with a false belief. Crucially, the bulk of the cognitive work is done
by the testifier (here: Russell). After all, Russell is the one who has
the crucial cognitive ability in this case. If so, by Pritchard’s lights,
the belief about the time Russell’s cousin forms does not qualify as
a cognitive achievement. We thus have a case of unsafe knowledge
without cognitive achievement. Pritchard’s diagnosis of the intuition
of knowledge in terms of mistaking cognitive achievement for knowl-
edge fails on yet another count [see also Author 2009b]. Despite
Pritchard’s efforts, then, safety-based accounts of knowledge remain
in trouble.
3 Virtue Epistemology
Thus far, I have put Frankfurt cases to use against safety-based ac-
counts of knowledge. In this section, I will try to show that they
have a wider-ranging impact as they also serve to generate a prob-
lem for the two leading virtue theoretic accounts of knowledge, due
to John Greco and Ernest Sosa. More specifically, I will argue that
both Greco and Sosa’s versions of VE have the undesirable conse-
quence that agents in Frankfurt cases lack knowledge as well, at least
so long as they hold on to their respective accounts of Fake Barn
cases. In order to see how the argument works, I will first have to
briefly sketch Greco and Sosa’s virtue epistemological accounts of
knowledge and their accounts of Fake Barn cases. I will start with
Greco.
3.1 Greco
Greco takes abilities to be dispositions to achieve results within a
certain range. Moreover, abilities are relative to what Greco calls “en-
vironments” (E), that is “sets of relatively stable circumstances”, and
“conditions” (C) or “sets of shifting circumstances within an environ-
ment” [Greco 2010: 77]. This core idea is unpacked in more detail as
follows:
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S has an ability A(R/C) relative to environment E = Across the
set of relevantly close worlds W where S is in C and in E, S has
a high rate of success in achieving R.
[Greco 2010: 77]
In case of the cognitive abilities at issue in his version of VE, R = true
belief (in propositions within a certain range). In order to possess
the relevant kind of cognitive ability relative to C and E, one must be
such that, at close worlds at which one is in C and E, one attains true
belief about propositions in the range with a high rate of success.
In addition, Greco maintains that attributions of abilities afford
a contextualist semantics: context determines which ability to R in
C and E is picked out by ‘ability to R’. In the case of attributions
of the cognitive abilities at issue in VE the story is even more com-
plex: context first determines a practical reasoning context, which
may be the agent’s, the attributors’ or some third party’s. The rele-
vant cognitive ability picked out by ‘cognitive ability’ is then fixed in
accordance with what Greco takes to be a core function of the concept
of knowledge, to wit, flagging actionable information and sources of
information, where what is actionable is determined by the practical
reasoning context fixed at the first step [Greco 2010: 78-79].
Finally, Greco unpacks the because relation at issue in VE in terms
of explanatory salience: a success is because of ability just in case
ability plays a salient or important part in the causal explanation of
the success. Crucially, abilities have default salience in such expla-
nations. This default salience may be trumped by abnormal factors,
which are salience magnets, as it were [Greco 2010: 73-75].
According to Greco, this is precisely what happens in standard
Gettier cases. For instance, when an agent acquires a true belief about
the time by taking a reading from a clock that stopped exactly twelve
hours earlier [Pritchard 2005: 137-38, which he takes from Russell
1948], the fact that the clock stopped exactly twelve hours earlier
constitutes the abnormal factor which trumps the default salience of
the agent’s ability. What is salient in the causal explanation of why
the agent forms a true belief about the time here is not the fact that
he exercises his ability to read the clock. Rather, it is the fact that
he happens to look at the clock exactly twelve hours after it stopped.
For that reason, even though the agent exercises his clock-reading
ability and attains cognitive success, his success is not because of the
exercise of his ability. In this way, Greco can explain the absence of
knowledge in such cases.
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Let’s now take a closer look at how Greco deals with Fake Barns.
As a first observation, Greco grants that this case cannot be dealt
with in the same way as standard Gettier cases. The reason for this is
that there doesn’t appear to be an abnormality in play in the causal
explanation of why Barnes forms a true belief. True, there might
have been such an abnormality—for instance, if Barnes had arrived
at a true belief despite looking at a fake barn. But, of course, this is
not to say that the abnormality does actually obtain.
Accordingly, Greco pursues a rather different strategy here, which
relies essentially on his contextualist semantics for knowledge attri-
butions. More specifically, Greco aims to show that in the context that
obtained when we considered Fake Barns and in which we found it
intuitive that Barnes does not know that he is looking at a barn, the
semantic value of ‘ability to form true beliefs about the presence of
barns’ is something like ability to form true beliefs about the presence
of barns whilst moving through an area featuring mostly indistinguishable
fakes. The idea here is that the cognitive ability’s E include the wider
area in which Barnes finds himself and in which fake barns predom-
inate. Moreover, the ability’s C are not restricted to circumstances in
which Barnes happens to look out of the window just when he passes
the one real barn, but also include circumstances in which he looks
out of the window a little bit earlier or later and ends up looking at
a fake barn. But now notice that, given that the C and E are thus un-
derstood, the majority of nearby worlds at which Barnes is in these C
and E and forms a belief about the presence of a barn are worlds at
which Barns ends up looking at a fake barn. Since, at those worlds,
Barnes ends up with a false belief that he is looking at a barn, it is not
the case that Barnes attains true beliefs about the presence of barns
at a high rate across nearby worlds in these C and E. On Greco’s
account of abilities, then, Barnes does not have the ability to form
true beliefs about the presence of barns relative to these C and E. In
consequence, in our context, the attribution of the relevant cognitive
ability to Barnes is false and the denial of knowledge is true.
But now notice that, on Greco’s account, sentences of the form ‘S
knows that p’ and ‘S does not know that p’ do not express proposi-
tions unless (i) a practical reasoning context and (ii) what counts as
actionable information in that context have been determined. While
Greco effectively endorses this consequence of his view [Greco 2010:
79-80], it does appear to generate some trouble for him.3 To see this,
notice that the description of Fake Barns appears to leave both of
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these issues wide open. But given that this is so, the sentence ‘Barnes
does not know that he is looking at a barn’ doesn’t express a propo-
sition in the context that obtained when you read Fake Barns. At
the same time, you agreed (if only implicitly) with my assertion of ‘I
take it to be agreed that Barnes does not know that he is looking at
a barn’. Now, this is rather puzzling. If Greco is right and ‘Barnes
does not know that he is looking at a barn’ does not express a propo-
sition in that context, we’d expect competent speakers of English like
yourself to disagree with this assertion. After all, the object of agree-
ment is a proposition. If ‘Barnes does not know that he is looking
at a barn’ doesn’t express a proposition, there simply is no suitable
object for agreement. We’d expect competent speakers of English
to notice this and to refuse to accept my assertion. If this isn’t im-
mediately obvious, compare: You are standing in a room with fifty
paintings by a variety of artists. I walk in and assert: ‘I take it to
be agreed that this is a Picasso.’ offering no indication of what ‘this’
is supposed to refer to. Given that you are a competent speaker of
English, we would expect you to disagree with my assertion. If you
decided to respond, we would not expect you to say ‘Yes, you are
right.’ Rather, we’d expect you, for instance, to point out that before
you can agree you will have to know which painting I have in mind.
In other words, we’d expect you to spot the problem and refuse to
accept the assertion. For that reason, the fact that you agreed with
my assertion about Barnes suggests that ‘Barnes doesn’t know that
he is looking at a barn’ did express a proposition when I asserted ‘I
take it to be agreed that Barnes does not know that he is looking at a
barn’ in the context that obtained when you read Fake Barns. Greco
thus faces a difficulty.
I assume that Greco’s response to this difficulty is that there is
a default practical reasoning context and a default standard for ac-
tionable information, which we are in play in contexts in which no
explicit information about the practical reasoning context and what
counts as actionable information are provided. If so, then it is the
default practical reasoning context and standard for actionable infor-
mation that are in play in the context that obtained when you agreed
that Barnes does not know that he is facing a barn upon reading
Fake Barns. For Greco’s account of the absence of knowledge in
Fake Barns to work, the C and E at issue in the default practical
reasoning context and given default standards for actionable infor-
mation must be wide enough to include the wider area Barnes finds
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himself in as well as circumstances in which Barnes looks out of the
window a bit earlier or later and ends up looking at a fake barn.
With these points in play, let’s return to Frankfurt Clock. No-
tice that, here too, we have not been given explicit information about
the practical reasoning context and the standards for actionable in-
formation. Yet, again we have no difficulties in agreeing that Russell
knows. We may thus assume that the default practical reasoning con-
text and standard for actionable information obtain. Now, crucially,
if, in Fake Barns, the C and E at issue in the default practical reason-
ing context and given default standards for actionable information
are wide enough to include circumstances in which Barnes looks out
of the window a bit earlier or later and ends up looking at a fake
barn, then, in Frankfurt Clock, the C and E that are in play by
default will be wide enough to include circumstances in which Rus-
sell looks at the clock a bit earlier or later. Of course, in those cases,
the demon shows his hand and Russell ends up with a false belief
about the time. The difficulty for Greco is that that the majority of
nearby worlds are worlds at which one of these circumstances ob-
tains. It is thus not the case that Russell attains true beliefs about
the time at a high rate across nearby worlds in the relevant C and
E. On Greco’s account of abilities, then, Russell does not have the
ability to form true beliefs about the time relative to these C and E.
The attribution of the relevant cognitive ability to Russell is false in
the context that obtained when you read Frankfurt Clock and, in
consequence, the denial of knowledge is true in that context. Greco’s
account of Fake Barns, if successful, will lead him to pass the wrong
verdict in Frankfurt Clock. This is, of course, bad news for Greco.
3.2 Sosa
According to Sosa, abilities are dispositions to perform well. Roughly
speaking, they are dispositions that issue performances that, in turn
are likely to be successful. Let’s see how Sosa unpacks this rough
idea in a bit more detail.
Dispositions have three essential components: a constitution com-
ponent (CO), a condition (or shape) component (SH) and a situation
component (SI). Consider, for instance, a match’s disposition to light
when struck. Its constitution component comprises certain physical
and chemical properties of the powdery head, its condition compo-
nent includes, among other things, being dry, and its situation com-
ponent includes being in oxygen [Sosa 2010: 465]. Dispositions also
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correspond to trigger-manifestation conditionals. To see what that
means, consider the disposition to light when struck once more. The
trigger here is striking, the manifestation is lighting. Our match can
be said to have this disposition, if and only if the conditional ‘if the
match were struck, it would likely light’ is true of it, at least when
the match satisfies CO and is in SH and SI [Sosa 2010: 466].
In case of the cognitive abilities at issue in VE, the performances
issued are beliefs and the successes are truths [Sosa 2011: 1]. For
instance, the ability to read the clock is a disposition that issues be-
liefs about the time. A given belief about the time is successful if true.
Cognitive abilities also feature CO, SH and SI components. In case of
the ability to read the clock, the CO are properties of the agent that
constitute the seat of the disposition, the SH include, among other
things, being awake and sober and the SI include there being enough
light to take a reading and a normally functioning clock. Cognitive
abilities also correspond to trigger-manifestation conditionals. For
instance, one can be said to have the ability to read the clock if and
only if the conditional ‘if one were to form a belief about the time,
one’s belief would likely be true’ is true of one, at least when one
satisfies the relevant CO and is in SH and SI.
Sosa analyses the because relation in terms of ability manifesta-
tion: a success is because of ability just in case the success mani-
fests ability. Crucially, a success manifests a certain ability only if
the ability’s SH and SI are satisfied [Sosa 2010: 470]. According
to Sosa, when our agent’s ability to read the clock issues a true be-
lief about the time in suitable SH and SI, his success manifests his
clock-reading ability. It does so (in part) because the SH and SI are
suitable. In contrast, when the SH or SI are not suitable the agent
will not attain success because of ability, not even if the performance
turns out to be successful.
With these points in play it is easy to see how Sosa can deal with
standard Gettier cases: while the agent attains the relevant cognitive
success, the relevant cognitive ability’s SI are not satisfied. For in-
stance, consider once more the case of the agent who forms a true
belief by taking a reading from a clock that stopped exactly twelve
hours earlier. Since the clock is stopped, the SI of his clock-reading
ability are not satisfied. In consequence, the agent’s true belief does
not manifest his clock-reading ability. The agent falls short of at-
taining success because of ability. In this way, Sosa can explain the
absence of knowledge in this case.
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Just like Greco, Sosa agrees that Fake Barn cases cannot be dealt
with in the same way as standard Gettier cases. In fact, Sosa ac-
knowledges (i) that there are non-epistemic analogues of these cases
in which (ii) the agents do attain success because of ability, and that
(iii), for that reason, the agents in Fake Barn cases should be cred-
ited with success because of ability also. Unsurprisingly, then, Sosa
thinks it would be a mistake to opt for the kind of account of these
cases favoured by Greco and deny agents in Fake Barn cases even
the possession of the relevant cognitive abilities [Sosa 2010: 469]. But
given that Sosa accepts that agents in Fake Barn cases attain success
because of ability, how can he account for the intuition that they lack
knowledge?
In order to answer this question, Sosa introduces a distinction be-
tween animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Animal knowl-
edge is true belief that manifests a first-order ability, such as, for
instance, the ability to spot barns. Reflective knowledge, in contrast,
requires true belief that, in addition, manifests a second-order mon-
itoring ability. Sosa’s strategy is to argue that, while agents in Fake
Barn cases have animal knowledge, they lack reflective knowledge.
Crucially, according to Sosa, intuitions about knowledge track the
presence and absence of reflective knowledge [Sosa 2010: 474 and
Sosa 2011: 92-93]. As a result, if the strategy can be successfully
implemented, the intuition of ignorance will be duly explained.
Let’s take a closer look at how Sosa ventures to argue that agents
in Fake Barn cases lack reflective knowledge. As a first step, he notes
that, just like first-order abilities, second-order abilities, too, are dis-
positions that make success highly likely and are relative to shape
and situational conditions. Crucially, according to Sosa, the SI of the
second-order abilities include the following condition: one must be
so situated that “sooner or later there would be tell-tale signs” if the
first-order ability’s SH or SI were unsuitable [Sosa 2010: 473]. The
reason why agents in Fake Barn cases lack reflective knowledge is
that it is precisely not the case that there would sooner or later be
tell-tale signs if the SI of the relevant first-order ability were not sat-
isfied. For instance, in Fake Barns, if the SI of Barnes’s first-order
barn-spotting ability were not satisfied, Barnes would be looking at
an indistinguishable fake barn. In that case, however, there would be
no indication of the fact that the SI for the first-order ability are not in
place. So, even if Barnes’s true belief that he is looking at a barn man-
ifests first-order cognitive ability, it does not manifest second-order
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ability. Barnes attains animal knowledge but falls short of reflective
knowledge.
It is not hard to see that, if Sosa’s story handles Fake Barn cases in
a satisfactory manner, it is bound to get him into trouble with Frank-
furt cases. Let’s return to Frankfurt Clock and ask what would be
the case if the SI for the first-order ability were not satisfied. The
answer is that Russell would have come down a minute earlier or
later and the demon would have manipulated the clock to read ‘8:22’
anyway. It is easy to see that there would not sooner or later be
tell-tale signs for Russell to pick up on here. So, the SI for Russell’s
second-order ability are not satisfied. Russell falls short of reflective
knowledge. Since intuitions about knowledge are said to track the
presence and absence of reflective knowledge, Sosa’s account incor-
rectly predicts an intuition of absence of knowledge here.
4 Conclusion
It comes to light that Frankfurt cases serve to generate a problem for
some of the most promising accounts of knowledge on the episte-
mological market, to wit safety-based accounts and the two leading
virtue epistemological accounts.
Does that mean that we should abandon these accounts and move
on in our search for a workable account of knowledge? Perhaps.
On the other hand, it may be that the problem here is instantiates
a deeper underlying difficulty, which affects a much wider range of
(and perhaps all) accounts of knowledge that aim to analyse knowl-
edge in terms of justified true belief and an anti-Gettier condition. I
will not try to drive this point home here. Rather, I will rest content
with stating the following challenge that any adequate such account
of knowledge will have to meet, viz. to countenance an anti-Gettier
condition that is strong enough to explain the absence of knowledge
in Fake Barn cases, whilst, at the same time, being weak enough to
allow the presence of knowledge in Frankfurt cases.
I’d like to add that meeting this challenge is by no means triv-
ial. Most standard proposals in literature are prone to fail it in one
way or another. Modal accounts, such as safety and sensitivity-based
accounts, fail it because the conditions they impose are too strong:
they predict absence of knowledge in Frankfurt cases. The same goes
for no defeaters accounts.4 Other accounts fail in that the proposed
conditions are too weak to explain the absence of knowledge in Fake
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Barn cases. Some less sophisticated versions of virtue epistemology,
i.e. versions that do not add a special story for Fake Barn cases, are a
case in point, as are the closely related proper functionalist accounts.
No false lemma and causal accounts have long been known to suc-
cumb to Fake Barn cases. If there exists a workable account of knowl-
edge in terms of justified true belief and an anti-Gettier condition that
gets both Fake Barn cases and Frankfurt cases right, epistemology
still awaits its discovery.
Perhaps, rather than holding our breath for an account of knowl-
edge that succeeds where its predecessors have failed, we should do
agree with Pritchard and prepare to sacrifice at least one of the in-
tuitions in Fake Barn cases and Frankfurt cases. Even so, we ought
not dismiss either intuition simply out of hand. At the very least,
we need an error theory for the intuition we sacrifice that is work-
able in the sense that it explains why intuition leads us astray in
one of the two types of case, without incorrectly predicting the pres-
ence/absence of the intuition in the other. And it is worth noting that
epistemology also still awaits its discovery.
So the conclusion that we might be inclined to draw at this stage is
that vital work remains to be done in epistemology. But wait! There
is another option. After all, it might be that, while there is an impor-
tant difference between Fake Barn and Frankfurt cases, this difference
cannot be explained without invoking the concept of knowledge. For
instance, it may be that the way in which Russell and Barnes differ
is just not be explicable without saying that Russell has knowledge
whilst Barnes doesn’t. One advantage of this interpretation of the
cases is that we can avoid sacrificing intuitions, another that we do
not need to hold our breath for further epistemological discoveries.
Of course, if there are genuine differences between these cases
that cannot be explained without invoking the concept of knowledge,
there is little hope for an analysis of knowledge in terms of justified
true belief and an anti-Gettier condition. After all, any such analysis
is then bound to make the wrong predictions either in Fake Barn
cases or in Frankfurt cases. In that case, Fake Barn and Frankfurt
cases would provide reason to favour a knowledge first approach to
epistemology [Williamson 2000, 2010] over its traditional rivals.
Notes
1 It may be worth noting that, in more recent work, Pritchard has moved to
a full-blown sliding scale account of the tolerance for error at nearby worlds. The
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idea is that at nearby worlds closest to actuality, safety tolerates no false beliefs and
the further we move away from actuality the more false beliefs safety is compatible
with. However, Pritchard has not given a precise statement of safety in recent
work. Note also that, in recent references to “versions of the safety principle”
in the literature, Pritchard [2012b: 170, n.3, 2013: n.10] lists the above as the last
version in his own work.
2 [Author 2009a]. I owe inspiration for this case to Frankfurt’s famous [1969]
cases. For alternative counterexamples to the safety condition see [Comesaña 2005,
Neta and Rohrbaugh 2004]. In [Author 2009a], I also argue that my Frankfurt case
makes for a better counterexample to the safety condition than these alternatives.
3 In fact, there is reason to believe that it is a vital feature of our concept of
knowledge that it is applicable without information about the specificities of some
practical reasoning context [Craig 1990].
4 If this isn’t immediately obvious, note that both of the following constitute
defeaters for Russell’s belief that it is 8:22: (i) ‘The grandfather clock is under the
control of an agent who wants you to believe that it is 8:22 when you look at it.’ (ii)
‘The grandfather clock would have displayed ‘8:22’ even if it hadn’t been 8:22.’
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